"Perhaps the Southern Cameroonian made the decision to join up with the Cameroon Republic through fear of the Ibo, or because of lack of finance or lack of leadership by the United Kingdom in the past, for we have tried our best to remain neutral; or was it because he had no third choice offered to him?" John Tilney, House of Commons, February 20, 1961.
I am not sure what time it is now in the Cameroons, but I am quite sure that it is high time that thought was given by some Ministers and by the United Nations to the very urgent affairs of that territory. I ought, at the outset, to declare an interest in that I am a director of a company which, among many other interests, has for over seventy years operated in Victoria and elsewhere in the territory, albeit of recent years with declining success. It has a venture also in Bamenda.
The battle of the plebiscite is now over. I pay tribute to the men, many of them from the United Kingdom, who have worked hard to make the administration of that democratic decision a success. Though they were unable to put the pros and cons of the results of the choice before the electorate, they tried to make a very nearly totally illiterate electorate aware of what the choices were.
The House will know that the ex-British Cameroons, albeit a small part of the old German Cameroons, is itself divided between North and South. The North itself is divided by a small strip of land belonging to Nigeria around Yola. The North Cameroons, by not a very large majority, has elected to become the thirteenth province of the Northern Region of Nigeria. How the Northern Regional Government administers a divided province and whether women there, who in many constituencies outnumber men, will agitate to keep their suffrage, is now not for us in this country to determine. We merely welcome the sound sense of the Northern Cameroonians in deciding to join up with Nigeria, which is such a stalwart member of the Commonwealth.
In the South, however, things have gone very differently. By an even greater majority than expected, a registered voting population of about 350,000 people, or approximately the same as that of Mauretania or Cyprus, has decided to link up with the Cameroon Republic. The South Cameroonian is lucky enough to live in, perhaps, the most lovely country of Africa, varying from the banana plantations of Tiko to the 13,000-ft. Cameroon mountain. Further north, he has a country which reminds one of Norway on a hot summer's day. It is a country which has great potential for rubber and for tea.
Perhaps the Southern Cameroonian made the decision to join up with the Cameroon Republic through fear of the Ibo, or because of lack of finance or lack of leadership by the United Kingdom in the past, for we have tried our best to remain neutral; or was it because he had no third choice offered to him? I am one who loves the territory and its peoples. Mr. Foncha has been to my home, and Dr. Endeley and the late Chief Manga Williams I count among my friends. Mr. Foncha is lucky to lead a country where there is virtually no crime, yet I suspect that the United Nations has given him and the United Kingdom, as the Trust authority, an almost impossible task.
Have the mechanics of handing over power really been thought out? Will the territory enjoy British or Roman law in the future? Will the tongue that unites the many tribes be English or French? It may be said that both could exist side by side, but that cannot be true in the case of, first, currency; secondly, whether the territory is to be in the sterling area or in the franc zone; and, thirdly, whether it is to enjoy Imperial Preference.
An even more vital decision must be made soon. Nearby, in the territory of the Bamileke, just over the border, there is much unrest. Civil war is virtually endemic. What will happen to the border? Will it remain a border? If so, who will protect it? If President Ahidjo's security forces pursue armed refugees into the British South Cameroons and British troops stop them, for how long will the British public be content if our troops are endangered for the welfare of a people who have just voted themselves out of the Commonwealth, who have chosen union with a Government which, according to The Times of last Saturday, are protesting to the United Kingdom about the conduct of the plebiscite?
274 It may, therefore, be that we should go quickly and with good grace. Mr. Foncha may have had great confidence in Britain and may still hope that we, despite everything, will carry on till he is strong enough to get good terms from President Ahidjo, but very soon in this country the cry may go up, "Bring the lads home" and then, I would ask, who will protect the British and Nigerian lives as well as the very difficult frontier?
There is also the problem of Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service and of all those on contract and of those who work in the Cameroon Development Corporation which is associated with the Colonial Development Corporation. This is not the time to go into the pros and cons of whether a further nearly £3 million of our public money, with all its currency and balance of payments problems, should be paid to what will be in the future a foreign country, although, of course, it is advisable in some way to help such an underdeveloped land.
It may be wise to hand over our obligations to the Cameroons Development Corporation to the Six. Perhaps the Germans, with their great reserves and as part of their new African investment programme, would welcome a chance to go back and aid their erstwhile territory. I am glad, therefore, that in another place the Minister of State for the Colonies said that should circumstances then so develop that the state of the Cameroons Development Corporation's affairs is materially altered, the Colonial Development Corporation are in a position to reconsider their commitments." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords; 9th February, 1961; Vol. 228, c. 498.] I would ask my right hon. Friend what the United Kingdom Government are doing to establish a strong local police force without which Mr. Foncha is naturally very weak. Is anything being done to bring back the militarily trained Cameroonians who are serving elsewhere? Is there any plan for an accelerated police training programme? At present, there is no para-military wing of the police force. There are no mortars and no automatics. Such a force could never match President Ahidjo's forces should be decide to occupy the ex-British South Cameroons, but it should surely be strong enough to keep internal order as soon as British troops leave, which I personally hope will be very soon.
275 But before we leave, sovereignty has got to be handed over—to what body? To a joint Government which Mr. Foncha and President Ahidjo set up? But what happens if they do not agree? Do we hand over to President Ahidjo himself, or do we risk British lives in what may be an indefinite wrangle? As well as the security problem let me list the urgent decisions which have got to be taken at once about the Southern Cameroons. Who will represent her in foreign affairs? Will she be accepted at the United Nations or, for the time being, be treated as a colony of the Cameroon Republic? When will British currency cease to be legal tender, and with what shall we pay for bananas which come in the fast ships which I see passing the end of my garden in Liverpool?
What sort of court of appeal will there be from now on? When will the customs tariff be changed to that, presumably, of the Cameroon Republic, thereby, incidentally, probably raising the cost of living? What instructions have been given to stop Imperial Preference? In 1958, this affected 82,000 tons of bananas, worth at that time to the Southern Cameroons as much as £600,000? And, most important of all, what plans have we received from President Ahidjo, other than his decision not to become part of the French community, thereby losing, presumably, any chance of benefiting from the expanding European Market?
I am worried because I think that the electorate voted blind as to the implications of their vote, and since, in the words of Nigeria's Prime Minister, …they expect as of right to live in peace, to cultivate their farms in peace, and to receive the same justice which has been provided for them until now, they may risk losing everything. I am worried, too, that this has been a problem of many Ministries, and it is a problem caused by the limitation of choice by the United Nations, a choice limited to incorporation into one of the two big neighbours on either side of the South Cameroons. I am worried that no thought has been given to true independence, and thereby we may in the future face another and minor Congo.
I am grateful to the Minister of State for coming to answer me at this late 276 hour. I would like to put it to him that once Mr. Foncha has achieved the end of trusteeship, surely it is up to him and his Government to decide the future of his country. It may be that he would prefer independence to incorporation. He may have second thoughts about union with his neighbour. I believe the South Cameroons could be viable, certainly in ten years, once its future is settled.
Let us say openly that, provided Mr. Foncha, should he be urged to independence by his own African friends, decides on that policy, we would help him, especially if he wished to remain a member of the Commonwealth. If need be, let us have another plebiscite. I fully understand how impossible it was to promise further aid last year. But if he decides to break off relations with President Ahidjo, the United Nations cannot force him to unite with his neigh-bour. The trump cards are in Mr. Foncha's hand, and if he decides to play them let us back him.
In the South, however, things have gone very differently. By an even greater majority than expected, a registered voting population of about 350,000 people, or approximately the same as that of Mauretania or Cyprus, has decided to link up with the Cameroon Republic. The South Cameroonian is lucky enough to live in, perhaps, the most lovely country of Africa, varying from the banana plantations of Tiko to the 13,000-ft. Cameroon mountain. Further north, he has a country which reminds one of Norway on a hot summer's day. It is a country which has great potential for rubber and for tea.
Perhaps the Southern Cameroonian made the decision to join up with the Cameroon Republic through fear of the Ibo, or because of lack of finance or lack of leadership by the United Kingdom in the past, for we have tried our best to remain neutral; or was it because he had no third choice offered to him? I am one who loves the territory and its peoples. Mr. Foncha has been to my home, and Dr. Endeley and the late Chief Manga Williams I count among my friends. Mr. Foncha is lucky to lead a country where there is virtually no crime, yet I suspect that the United Nations has given him and the United Kingdom, as the Trust authority, an almost impossible task.
Have the mechanics of handing over power really been thought out? Will the territory enjoy British or Roman law in the future? Will the tongue that unites the many tribes be English or French? It may be said that both could exist side by side, but that cannot be true in the case of, first, currency; secondly, whether the territory is to be in the sterling area or in the franc zone; and, thirdly, whether it is to enjoy Imperial Preference.
An even more vital decision must be made soon. Nearby, in the territory of the Bamileke, just over the border, there is much unrest. Civil war is virtually endemic. What will happen to the border? Will it remain a border? If so, who will protect it? If President Ahidjo's security forces pursue armed refugees into the British South Cameroons and British troops stop them, for how long will the British public be content if our troops are endangered for the welfare of a people who have just voted themselves out of the Commonwealth, who have chosen union with a Government which, according to The Times of last Saturday, are protesting to the United Kingdom about the conduct of the plebiscite?
274 It may, therefore, be that we should go quickly and with good grace. Mr. Foncha may have had great confidence in Britain and may still hope that we, despite everything, will carry on till he is strong enough to get good terms from President Ahidjo, but very soon in this country the cry may go up, "Bring the lads home" and then, I would ask, who will protect the British and Nigerian lives as well as the very difficult frontier?
There is also the problem of Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service and of all those on contract and of those who work in the Cameroon Development Corporation which is associated with the Colonial Development Corporation. This is not the time to go into the pros and cons of whether a further nearly £3 million of our public money, with all its currency and balance of payments problems, should be paid to what will be in the future a foreign country, although, of course, it is advisable in some way to help such an underdeveloped land.
It may be wise to hand over our obligations to the Cameroons Development Corporation to the Six. Perhaps the Germans, with their great reserves and as part of their new African investment programme, would welcome a chance to go back and aid their erstwhile territory. I am glad, therefore, that in another place the Minister of State for the Colonies said that should circumstances then so develop that the state of the Cameroons Development Corporation's affairs is materially altered, the Colonial Development Corporation are in a position to reconsider their commitments." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords; 9th February, 1961; Vol. 228, c. 498.] I would ask my right hon. Friend what the United Kingdom Government are doing to establish a strong local police force without which Mr. Foncha is naturally very weak. Is anything being done to bring back the militarily trained Cameroonians who are serving elsewhere? Is there any plan for an accelerated police training programme? At present, there is no para-military wing of the police force. There are no mortars and no automatics. Such a force could never match President Ahidjo's forces should be decide to occupy the ex-British South Cameroons, but it should surely be strong enough to keep internal order as soon as British troops leave, which I personally hope will be very soon.
275 But before we leave, sovereignty has got to be handed over—to what body? To a joint Government which Mr. Foncha and President Ahidjo set up? But what happens if they do not agree? Do we hand over to President Ahidjo himself, or do we risk British lives in what may be an indefinite wrangle? As well as the security problem let me list the urgent decisions which have got to be taken at once about the Southern Cameroons. Who will represent her in foreign affairs? Will she be accepted at the United Nations or, for the time being, be treated as a colony of the Cameroon Republic? When will British currency cease to be legal tender, and with what shall we pay for bananas which come in the fast ships which I see passing the end of my garden in Liverpool?
What sort of court of appeal will there be from now on? When will the customs tariff be changed to that, presumably, of the Cameroon Republic, thereby, incidentally, probably raising the cost of living? What instructions have been given to stop Imperial Preference? In 1958, this affected 82,000 tons of bananas, worth at that time to the Southern Cameroons as much as £600,000? And, most important of all, what plans have we received from President Ahidjo, other than his decision not to become part of the French community, thereby losing, presumably, any chance of benefiting from the expanding European Market?
I am worried because I think that the electorate voted blind as to the implications of their vote, and since, in the words of Nigeria's Prime Minister, …they expect as of right to live in peace, to cultivate their farms in peace, and to receive the same justice which has been provided for them until now, they may risk losing everything. I am worried, too, that this has been a problem of many Ministries, and it is a problem caused by the limitation of choice by the United Nations, a choice limited to incorporation into one of the two big neighbours on either side of the South Cameroons. I am worried that no thought has been given to true independence, and thereby we may in the future face another and minor Congo.
I am grateful to the Minister of State for coming to answer me at this late 276 hour. I would like to put it to him that once Mr. Foncha has achieved the end of trusteeship, surely it is up to him and his Government to decide the future of his country. It may be that he would prefer independence to incorporation. He may have second thoughts about union with his neighbour. I believe the South Cameroons could be viable, certainly in ten years, once its future is settled.
Let us say openly that, provided Mr. Foncha, should he be urged to independence by his own African friends, decides on that policy, we would help him, especially if he wished to remain a member of the Commonwealth. If need be, let us have another plebiscite. I fully understand how impossible it was to promise further aid last year. But if he decides to break off relations with President Ahidjo, the United Nations cannot force him to unite with his neigh-bour. The trump cards are in Mr. Foncha's hand, and if he decides to play them let us back him.
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