Boko Haram and the Fear of Islamic Extremism in Cameroon: Part 3 – Beyond the Hysteria...

By Dibussi Tande


January 2012 was a particularly hectic and nerve-wracking month for Cameroonian security and intelligence services, along with political, administrative and religious authorities in the “Grand Nord” as they frantically tried to put measures in place to hold back what they viewed as a potential, if not imminent, Boko Haram tidal wave across Northern Cameroon.

Measures taken thus far by Cameroonian authorities to keep the Nigerian Islamist sect in check have ranged from the surveillance and arrest of alleged Boko Haram militants, a call to order and even outright closure of Koranic schools, strict control of who and what is preached in mosques, arrest of itinerant Muslim  preachers, setting up of checkpoints in the outskirts of towns and villages, sensitization tours and crisis meetings with local administrative and religious officials, and officials from neighboring countries particularly Chad, all of this crowned with the deployment of 600 elite troops from 32nd Motorized Infantry Battalion in Mora and the 4th Joint Military Region in Maroua, to monitor the porous Cameroon/Nigeria border. In short, the region is under a de facto state of emergency whose impact has been made more acute by a growing economic crisis stemming from the closure of the Nigeria/Cameroon border in a region whose economy depends primarily, if not solely, on cross-border trade. And the discovery of alleged Boko Haram “hideouts” in the region, along with yet unverified claims in the Nigerian press that Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, has sought refuge in, and is operating from Ngaoundere, have only heightened the growing psychosis in the region.   

Although some observers argue that fears of Boko Haram moving or extending its operations into Cameroon are grossly exaggerated, and that the sect is not particularly interested in exporting its ideology to neighboring countries, others point to mounting evidence of a Boko Haram recruitment campaign in Northern Cameroon, and its use of Cameroon as a staging ground for attacks in Nigeria and as a source for arms – factors which will ultimately put the sect on a collision course with Cameroonian security forces. As a recent study points out,

It does constitute a very real danger in the area of western Africa, where there is every chance that if Boko Haram manages to establish a quasi-state in northeastern Nigeria, it will move toward other states in the region that have a long history of Muslim grievance and instability (such as Cameroon, Niger, and Chad). (24)

This view is supported by statements by Boko Haram indicating that it intends to eventually fan out its operations beyond Nigeria. As Musa Tanko, a spokesperson of the group, stated in March 2010,

“Islam doesn't recognize international boundaries; we will carry out our operations anywhere in the world if we can have the chance... but for now our attention is focused on Nigeria, which is our starting point. (16)

The operative word being “for now”...

Others also point out that while Boko Haram, as we know it today, may not necessarily be interested in setting up base in Cameroon, Niger or Chad, it nonetheless has the potential to become a franchise jihadist organization just like Al Queda by inspiring local Islamists to create homegrown and largely independent versions of the sect in neighboring countries with similar socio-economic conditions that gave rise to the movement in Nigeria. To assess the probability of this happening in Cameroon, it is necessary to review those conditions that led to the birth and growth of Boko Hara mand gauge if there a similar conditions in Cameroon.

Boko Haram and the Politics of Exclusion

Although Islamic fundamentalism is the driving force behind Boko Haram, the general consensus is that its emergence is directly linked to “the dynamics of exclusion” in Northern Nigeria, along with the inability of successive Nigerian governments to address the dire socio-economic situation in Northern Nigeria, particularly in Northeastern Nigeria where Boko Haram has its base, and which is considered the poorest region in the country. According to Salisu Suleiman,

The forces fanning the flames of these extremist activities are fired not by any ‘jihadist' agenda as much as by failure of governments at all levels to create economic opportunities... Dysfunctional governments, ignorance and hopelessness have led people to the arms of extremists. This explains (but certainly does not excuse) the mindless violence that has become a national security threat... unless and until the challenges of illiteracy, poverty, unemployment and loss of hope are addressed, the armies of unemployed youth on the ranks of extremist groups will remain ever ready to vent their angers, real or imaginary, on whatever represents the state.

The Politics of Thuggery

While the emergence of Boko Haram is deeply rooted in the socio-economic situation in Northern Nigeria, it is worth noting that its rise to prominence in Northern Nigeria was largely facilitated by an increasing tendency among Nigerian politicians to ally with local militia groups, constituted primarily of impoverished, unemployed and disenfranchised youths, for purposes of political control and hegemony, specifically “to terrorize opposition electors at constituency level or to combat other gangs engaged by their political opponents.” In the process, they have institutionalized “violence as a legitimate part of political process” in the region, particularly during elections. (See Politics of Thuggery and Patronage in Northeastern Nigeria). Suleiman notes, for example, that: 

Taking advantage of youth unemployment, the Gombe State government supported the ‘kallare' group; Bauchi State gave tacit support to the ‘sara suka', while the Borno government openly related with the ‘ecomog' group which directly or indirectly metamorphosed into the ‘boko haram'.

Haruna and Jumba note that “After elections, these boys trained to maim and kill political opponents are left helpless without any tangible means of sustenance.” Many of these youths, particularly in Northeast Nigeria, quickly become easy prey to radical Islamists who exploit their desperation.

A widely-accepted, albeit controversial, narrative is that Boko Haram rose to prominence in Borno State after it helped Ali Modu Sheriff to defeat Governor Mala Kachalla in the 2003 elections, and that the sect developed its antipathy towards the state after it fell out with the new governor.  While downplaying or writing off
Sheriff’s role in the emergence of Boko Haram as a powerful force in Borno, analysts such as Olly Owen nonetheless concede that “it is fair to say that the [Sherrif]administration, and others like it in the region, created the conditions for the spread of extremism by fostering thuggish, winner-takes-all corrupt politics at the same time as completely neglecting basic services and education.”

Today, Boko Haram’s tentacles run deep into the fabric of the Nigerian state with members, sympathizers and financiers in high places; a situation which led the Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan to complain recently that Boko Haram had infiltrated all levels and sectors of the Nigerian state apparatus:

Some of them are in the executive arm of government; some of them are in the parliamentary/legislative arm of government, while some of them are even in the judiciary. Some are also in the armed forces, the police and other security agencies. Some continue to dip their hands and eat with you and you won’t even know the person who will point a gun at you or plant a bomb behind your house.

The Cameroon Situation

Economically, Cameroon’s “Grand North” region is largely similar to Northern Nigeria with an ever growing disenfranchised and economically-deprived youth population. Like their counterparts in Nigeria, many of these youths are steadily retreating from the secular state and becoming easy prey to groups dangling the carrot of fundamentalist Islam as the way out of their misery and alienation. Still, the specific political conditions that gave rise to Boko Haram in Nigeria do not (yet) exist in Cameroon. While the neopatrimonial and prebendal political system in Cameroon is as dysfunctional as Nigeria’s, the violent political turf wars that have become characteristic of (Northern) Nigerian electoral politics since the reinstitution of civilian rule have not manifested themselves in Cameroon. Hence, the likelihood that a Boko Haram-type organization will emerge out of local political rivalries in Northern Cameroon is highly unlikely.

Second, Cameroon is unlike Nigeria where “religion plays a very vital and influential role in the society that has manifested itself as a potent force in the political development of the Nigerian state from pre-independence to post-independence,”(3) [Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The “Maitatsine” and “Boko Haram” Crises in Northern Nigeria], and where “The conservative Muslim elite in the north has never given up the idea of spreading its religion to the south.” As we saw in Part II, since independence, and beginning with Cameroon’s first President, Ahmadou Ahidjo, a Muslim, the Cameroonian state has been quite adept in keeping Islam on a tight leash and out of the public sphere. As Hamadou Adama explains (Islam and State in Cameroon: Between Tension and Accommodation),

The “whip” was resorted to in holding back attempts at emancipation from the state and discouraging the emergence of Islam in the public sphere, while the “carrot” was displayed to lure prospective traditional rulers as well as compromising religious leaders to rally round and relay state policy to lower levels of the society. In the development of the independent Cameroon nation state, habits developed over a long period of time and could not be stifled. In the forefront of these formations were prominent actors such as Ahmadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya who employed similar strategies to keep Islamic militancy at bay while secretly negotiating with obstreperous and prominent Muslim scholars. (8)

The result has been a Cameroonian Muslim establishment which rarely attempts to instrumentalize Islam for political purposes. Even during major crises of the last three decades that have pitted the Muslim community against the government, for example, the failed coup attempt of 1984 and its aftermath, or the explosive Yaounde Ntougou land dispute of 1992, these confrontations have never been framed in religious terms (i.e., Muslims against the state).

Thus, unlike in Nigeria where the reinstitution of civilian rule led to the emergence of a Muslim elite which used religion to directly and indirectly subvert the secular state and place Islam at the center of the public sphere in a particularly conflictual manner (especially with the adoption of sharia law in virtually all Northern Nigerian states), multiparty politics had the opposite effect in Cameroon; it brought the Muslim community, which had been in the political wilderness since 1984, back into the political mainstream, while reactivating the North-South axis on which Cameroonian politics has historically revolved.

Thus, the disconnect or chasm between the state and Islam in Cameroon is not as wide and increasingly unbridgeable as in Nigeria. Muslims across the board still operate within the framework of the secular state, and generally view any form of Islamic fundamentalism as an existential threat to their interests – one which puts their religion and the region on an unnecessary and potentially unwinnable collision course with the state. Among Cameroonian Muslims, Sharia law is unlikely to ever become a mainstream issue…

That said, the cooptation of virtually the entire Northern political and religious class into the Biya regime is a double-edged sword; while it gives the Northern elite access to rents and privilege within the system, it simultaneously erodes their political, religious and even cultural legitimacy particularly among the youths who are in increasingly disenchanted with the secular state and turning to groups and organizations— backed by deep pockets from the Arab world—promoting fundamentalist Islamic ideologies in the country. These groups continue to extend their reach as we saw in Parts 1 and II. In fact, the national council of Imams recently expressed concern over relatively lax laws which make it very easy for religious groups to set up shop in the country and operate without any effective oversight. “There [is] no legislation limiting foreign funding and it [is] difficult for local authorities to track down the origin of funds that [are] used to build new mosques, franco-Islamic schools or carry out Islamic Non Governmental Organizations’ activities,” says Gilbert Fah (in When the Periphery becomes the Center: New Islamic Dynamics in Douala-Cameroon, 11)…

Hamadou Adama (Islam and State in Cameroon: Between Tension and Accommodation) however minimizes the disruptive potential of these groups, arguing that the type of “political Islam, which they [Arab speaking intellectuals] have been trying to (re)introduce in the public sphere through associative movements, is actually in the process of transforming itself into a counter-cultural phenomenon, poorly defined for the moment, but is serving to alleviate current Muslim discontent with the Cameroon secular state.”

However, the fear that permeates the politico-military and religious establishment in Cameroon is that this new Islam also has the potential to aggravate and channel that discontent into a violent rejection of the State, as in the case of Boko Haram. The real question then is whether the Islamic fundamentalist groups that are steadily gaining a foothold in Cameroon have the capacity and penchant for violence. We will quickly look at two of these groups for possible pointers.

The Wahhabi Movement

Although they don’t have a history of violence in Cameroon other than their involvement  in the intra-sectarian clashes with the Tijanis in the 1990s and 2000s, many observers believe that the Wahhabi are most likely to turn to violent extremism if it ever came to that. A recent PBS report highlights the fact that “Wahhabism's rigidity has led it to misinterpret and distort Islam, pointing to extremists such as Osama bin Laden and the Taliban.”
We can also point to Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, a cleric who “embraced Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi/Salafi strain of Islam in the mid-1990s”  and whose “cosmological beliefs can be traced to Wahhabi fatwas”. Hence the description of Boko Haram as a “Salafi-Jihadist organization”.

It should be noted, however, that in spite of its Wahhabi roots, Boko Haram has never been embraced by mainstream Wahhabis in Nigeria. In the same vein, Boko Haram is violently against the Wahhabi movement in Nigeria, which it accuses of deviating from, and not being representative of true Islam. In 2010, for example, Boko Haram assassinated Bashir Kashara, a prominent Wahhabi cleric and an outspoken critic of the sect. Boko Haram has also denounced Yan Izala, the leading Wahhabi group in Nigeria (which incidentally shares  the same fundamentalist ideology with Boko Haram) for its close ties with the Muslim religious establishment, and its reluctance to wage Jihad against the Nigerian state.

Nonetheless, many observers believe that Wahhabism, which is already at loggerheads with moderate Islam in Africa, is also on a collision course with African states:

Islamism is on the rise throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa, transforming a moderate and integrated Muslim population into an ever more extremist one that is isolated from its non-Muslim neighbors. For African Muslims, the Islamist arrangement will entail an erosion of human rights and lead to intra-faith conflict between moderates and extremists. For African governments, Islamism will present a challenge to central authority and generate increasingly unmanageable inter-communal strife between Muslims and non-Muslims. And for non-Africans, Islamism will mean the continued development – in a region that, ominously, traditionally receives little attention from the Western security community – of a hospitable environment for terrorists with an international agenda. (An African Vortex: Islamism in Sub-Saharan Africa, 16)

Tablighi Jamaat
As we saw in Part II, another Islamist group with a foothold in Cameroon is the Tablighi Jamaat. Although it claims to be “strictly non-political” and has not been directly linked to any act of terrorism, some have labeled it a jihadist organization and a preparatory school for Al Qaeda because many of its members eventually gravitate towards Al Qaeda. Notable among these are Khalfan Khamis Mohammed and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani who were indicted for the US embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998; Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber,” who tried to blow up a plane bound for the US; and, Jose Padilla jailed in the US for conspiring to murder, kidnap and maim people on behalf of Al Qaeda. John Walker Lindh, the “American Taliban” was also a member of the group. It is also alleged that "dozens of the captives the USA holds in extrajudicial detention in its Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba, had their continued detention justified in part through their alleged association with the Tabligh Jamaat." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tablighi_Jamaat  

The Tablighi Jamaat is another group which is expected to eventually get in the crosshairs of those African states where more tolerant and moderate strands of Islam are practiced. According to one report,

The group's strict adherence to Islamic law and Mohammadan tradition (following the example of how the prophet did basic acts unconnected with religion) puts it at odds with many of the prevailing Islamic authorities in countries where TJ operates, especially those in Africa. It is building a structure of youthful Islamic rigor, and therefore… many Islamic scholars see its precincts as not-so-subtle training camps for future jihadists.”

It is also reported that the United States has also recently raised concerns that “Tablighi Jamaat’s expanding presence [in Sub-Saharan Africa] and conservative brand of Islam has the potential to serve as a recruiting ground for Al Qaeda and radical Sunni salafist organizations.”

Conclusion

Without doubt, the issue of militant Islam is a complex one, particularly in a country such as Cameroon which has traditionally practiced a moderate and tolerant strand of Islam. The spread of fundamentalist Islamic ideologies in the country is directly linked to the prevailing socio-political situation and to the sometimes violent doctrinal wars within the Islamic movement itself. Also, external factors such as the role of Arab countries, specifically Saudi Arabia, including developments in nearby countries such as Boko Haram’s violent terror campaign in Nigeria have played a significant, if not pivotal role. Hence, there is no quick and easy fix in the horizon.

The deployment of troops to the Grand North and increased security measures in the region are necessary stop-gap measures to hold back any significant Boko Haram incursion  into Cameroon. However, while strategies used by the Rapid Intervention Unit (BIR) to crack down the infamous ‘coupeurs de routes’ or highway robbers who once held sway over the region may prove useful, a more broad-based and regional approach is most likely to yield fruits. Possible options range from creating joint cross-border patrol teams in line with the recommendations of the 9th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) of 1996, to fully implementing Decision No 4 of the 10th Lake Chad Basin Commission Summit (2000) which called for the creation of a permanent multinational security force for the Lake Chad basin "to restore security atmosphere favorable for the development and movement of persons and goods within the Lake Chad basin".

In the meantime, Cameroon should seriously consider joining the Multi-National Joint Task Force Operation in Lake Chad, a security organization established by Nigeria, Chad and Niger to jointly monitor and enforce cross-border security in the Lake Chad region. Given that the task force is already operational, it may be the most appropriate regional military tool to deal with the Boko Haram threat.

In the end, however, the long term solution to the Boko Haram threat and the rise of militant Islam in Cameroon is socio-economic and political, for example, increased educational opportunities that allow youths to integrate the modern secular state rather than be stuck on the margins of that state as is the case today. As Mbonji Edjenguele, an anthropologist at the University of Yaounde I points out:

In a region such as the far north, where the rate of illiteracy remains high...prophets of doom from neighboring countries or elsewhere are able recruit followers to spread their disastrous ideas.

In addition, jump-starting economic development in the region, particularly through programs that target the unemployed youth, establishing a more representative system of local governance that includes a broader spectrum of the populace, improving social services and infrastructure to widen the safety for the disenfranchised, and strengthening the hand of civil society organizations that operate in the region, are some of the measures that can help diffuse the Islamic fundamentalist time bomb. Easier said than done in a region with deeply entrenched patterns and policies of social exclusion and systemic inequalities…

Comments

[aminu]

Video: Nigerian soldier from anti-bomb unit gets blown apart by BK bomb - http://pc2.vuclip.com/s150.vuclip.com/81/bf/81bf863538200b88654bdeb2fa8a8eba/ba63207/BokoHaramBomb_81bf_w_2.3gp?c=407015324&u=1540701836&s=BNX3pY&z=1202

[Wanko Debs]

Thanks a million for this very enlightening series which has really opened my eyes to a religion and a region of Cameroon that I was completely ignorant about. I hated history in secondary school because it was all about dead white men, but I am sure I would have been a history buff if such topics about our own country had been on the curriculum. Thanks once again!!

[Jimmy]

Now if Cameroon cannot control poachers from Sudan who slaughtered a record 200 elephants in the Far North in January alone, how on earth will they be able to monitor let alone arrest Boko Haram members who can easily melt into the crowd and carry out solo attacks with rudimentary tools?

elephant slaughter story here: http://tinyurl.com/798v9ee

[J. S. Dinga]

Nice write-up, sir, and thank you for opening this chapter.

I have some burning questions to ask. Is it not possible that Cameroon has Boko haram by a different name? You correctly pointed out the link to politics, especially the way politicians in Nigeria used disenchanted youth in their selfish political agendas. Did we not have some politicians and traditional rulers in the North and South-West associated with such practices not too long ago? Are the famous " Coupeurs de route" a thing of the past? What alternative can the government find to provide this sensitive group of youths to keep them from being drafted into these dangerous organizations? In a country like Cameroon - which practises political patronage involving giving one person cumulating functions even in the face of high unemployment - how can the youth find meaningful expression in life? Remember the group of young persons whom US ambassador Hariet Isom aptly described as the "nothing to lose" group? If the likes of Iya Mohammed can pile on functions upon fucntions, including the famous SODECOTON of North Cameroon which should have been the ideal alternative for these idle youths, how can the government possibly contain the development of a local Boko haram?

Today a US court sentenced Farouk Abdulmutallab an Al Qaeda operative to life imprisonment for his role in trying to blow up an American aircraft traveling from Europe to the US.The young man, from Southern Nigeria, had made forays into Cameroon. Is it not possible that he planted seeds of the Al Qaeda somewhere out there in Buea during his visit out there?
Is Cameroon really free of Islamic extemism?

[Ebeny]

Poachers slaughter 200 elephants in Cameroon national park in six weeks

Armed groups from Chad and Sudan blamed for unprecedented killing in Bouba Ndjida national park, fuelled by demand for ivory

http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/feb/17/poachers-slaughter-200-elephants-cameroon
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Boko Haram from the West (Nigeria), armed gangs from the East and North East (Chad, Sudan), and more armed gangs from the South East (Central African Republic), and the Bakassi rebels in the Southwest (Nigeria again...)

For how long before the Cameroonian center collapses?????

[cadmun]

To describe Boko Haram as "an extremist Islamist sect" is adding insult to injury. How can a discussion on Boko Haram be credible without acknowledging Sheik Mohammed Yusuf. Was it not his death(murder) that radicalise the groups activities.*
What about the heavy handed response by late Nigerian president Umaru Musa Yar’adua.Ironically,in North eastern Nigeria, "the army is more feared than Boko Haram."**
Who are the Boko Haram of Nigeria?***
Nigeria & Cameroon in particular and Africa as whole is on the tipping point of Enlightenment. In history, Enlightenment has often been likened to rebellion against corrupt authority. Africans are rejecting corrupt authoirities,and sometimes their method of rebellion can be very violent.

*Even the U.S which is often blind on such issues recognized that fact.See U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence report (November 30, 2011).Boko Haram:Emerging threat to U.S Homeland Security.
**"In Nigeria, Boko Haram Is Not the Problem," by Jean Herskovits. New York Times, January 2, 2012. Available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/opinion/in-nigeria-boko-haram-is-not-the-problem.html?pagewanted=all
*** Visit John Young's Cryptome.org webpage for more details, especially this page.The Boko Haram of Nigeria, available at http://cryptome.org/anwar-alawlaki/09-0805.htm

NOTE: There are audio recordings of Shiek Mohammed Yusuf circulating on the internet.Some have been translated into English. It is worth listening before making a judgement.

[KeN]

I take exception to your statement that Northeastern Nigerians fear the Nigerian army more than they do Boko Haram, as if that justifies the Boko Haram terror campaign! I spent six years as a student at the university of Ngaoundere during the time when the "coupeur de routes" phenomenon was at its worst. And I am certain that most poeple in the region would have told you that they still feared the Cameroonian army more than they did the "coupeurs de routes". But no one ever tried to downplay the reign of terror that these bandits imposed on the region. Neither did I ever encounter any during my trips in the region just because the army was more feared. Boko Haram remains an extremist group by virtue of the fundamentalist islam that it champions and a jihadist group by virtue of the acts of terror that it carries out in the name of Islam, no matter the justification.
Kingsley Enow

[J. S. Dinga]

Mr Kingsley Enow, I am interested in your comment. Frankly I am dying to know the situation with respect to those highway robbers (Coupeurs de route)in the Northern provinces. I lived the horrors of that gang and in fact a good friend of mine was savagely gunned down near Touboro, just next to my work place. It would be nice to know that things have calmed down for the better.

[Vic]

Cadmum's friends in action....

Up to 30 people have been killed in northeast Nigeria after suspected Islamists opened fire and set off bombs at a market, witnesses have claimed.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/9094436/30-killed-in-Nigeria-attack-witnesses-claim.html

[cadmun]

@Kingsley Enow
Hundreds of innocent Nigerians suspected of being Boko Haram members have been executed by the Nigerian army. The rule of law must find them guilty and then punishment should follow.Rather,the army which is a state institution is promoting the RULE OF GUN.No accountability and no trial of army officials carrying out summary execution.That is the reason why the people fear the army more than Boko Haram.Also note that in Nigeria there are some pragmatic opportunistic organisations using violence to achieve their stated goals while laying the blame on Boko Haram.*
@Vic
I do not support their ideology and method of operation. However, Boko Haram is an effect of a cause, that is,corrupt government and poverty.** While we deplore their method, we should acknowledge their grievances.
*"In Nigeria, Boko Haram Is Not the Problem," by Jean Herskovits. New York Times, January 2, 2012.Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/opinion/in-nigeria-boko-haram-is-notthe-problem.html?pagewanted=all

**"Bill Clinton blames poverty for rising violence in Nigeria," by Jon Gambrell.Associated Press,February 14,2012. Available at http://www.africanquarters.com/index.php/africa/west-africa/575-bill-clinton-blames-poverty-for-rising-violence-in-nigeria.html

[Hope Kale Ewusi]

Your brilliant expose sheds light on a phenomenon that has been ongoing in divers forms -stemming from the clash of civilizations counched in Western colonization of Africa along with Islamic infiltration - both steeped in antiquity . Boko Haram's emergence however miss guided their tactics & aspirations, is rooted in the same context of protest against alien influences which Chinua Achebe's celebrated novel deplores in leterary terms.Lest we forget, many African nations recently celebrated 50 years of independence from the West, - an independence which was bloodily contested and finally attained through valiant sacrifice of our forebears.With Western colonization came Christian values, while Arabic infiltration introduced Islam.Both faiths - inherently alien, albeit, have a lasting stranglehold in African religious conscience.. Beneath the Boko Haram mayhem lies the plight of a people ( African) striped-up perhaps or more aptly put a people devoid of robust native values that can thwart foreign influences ( socio-political / cultural ), while imposing in return strong contrarian currents capable of influencing alien detractors by force of will.While radicalized Islam proselytizes through mayhem, Western evangelism imposes its values through subtle indoctrination and the net effect in both instances basically has been the devaluation & dilution Afro- autochtonic values. Similar responses to perceived cultural encroachment belied the mayhem that terrorized the Swedish capital last year. The foregoing though limited in deference to brevity, underscores the global scope of radical contestation.Thus as the specter of radical Islamism creeps into our national turf, it is prudent to take precautionary measures to stem its spread, while at the same time examine the underlying factors that prompts the proliferation of extremist fervor.

[Edgar Sule]

It seems someone has been paying attention - "Nigeria and Cameroun, on Tuesday, reached an agreement to establish a trans-border security committee to fight terrorism."
============================================
Nigeria and Cameroon tighten borders
The two neighbouring countries agree to establish a trans-border security committee
Article | February 29, 2012 - 3:19am | By Chidi Okoye
Nigeria's foreign minister, Gbenga Ashiru

Nigeria and Cameroun, on Tuesday, reached an agreement to establish a trans-border security committee to fight terrorism.

Gbenga Ashiru, Foreign Affairs Minister, signed the agreement on behalf of the federal government. “The Agreement on the Establishment of the Trans-border Security Committee between Nigeria and Cameroun constitutes a major bilateral initiative aimed at strengthening security along our borders,” he said. “Nigeria is committed to its full implementation and the realization of its objectives in the interest of the progress, peace and security of the peoples of our two countries. We believe that Cameroun will also demonstrate (the) same commitment.”

Ashiru noted that the ceremony was taking place at a significant time of global fight against the scourge of terrorism and piracy that poses serious threat to international peace and security. “There is no region that is immune to the heinous activities of the terrorist groups and the pirates off the coasts,” he said. “The UN and the AU have led the international and regional initiatives respectively to combat these security challenges.”

Responding, the Cameroonian Vice-Prime Minister, Amadou Ali, expressed delight that the agreement has finally come to light. Speaking through an interpreter, he explained that the event was an important milestone in deepening relations between Nigeria and Cameroun stressing the importance of ensuring peace and security especially along our common boarders.

“Confidence has been restored through permanent dialogue and consultation, as well as the reinforcement of cooperation between our two countries,” he said. “The efforts of our two governments depend above all on the existence of peace and security along our common border. Insecurity is a friend to no country and today’s event demonstrates our common will to resolve a common problem. I have no doubt that we will rise up to the challenges of insecurity along our common boundary, notably terrorism, maritime piracy, and the phenomenon of highway robbery along borders. The present agreement is therefore the demonstration of our common faith and confidence in the future.”

http://www.dailytimes.com.ng/article/nigeria-and-cameroon-tighten-borders

[Bokowatch]

Lake Chad Basin Joint Force against Boko Haram Recommended
Wednesday, May 02, 2012

By Divine Ntaryike Jr

CameroonPostline.com -- Experts have urged member countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, LCBC to resurrect an idling joint military force they established close to fifteen years ago to wrestle the Nigerian terrorist Islamic group, the Boko Haram.

The recommendation was made on the sidelines of the 14th Heads of State and Government Summit of the six-member Lake Chad Basin Commission that opened in the Chadian capital N’Djamena Monday, April 30. “It’s the only effective way of ensuring a crossborder clampdown and eradication of the terrorists,” a source indicated.

However, a formal response from the commission member states is still awaited. The LCBC comprises Chad, the Central African Republic, Niger, Nigeria, Libya and Cameroon. In 1998, they agreed to set up a joint military force tasked with ensuring security around the lake which attracts fishermen and traders from the multi-country border intersection.

However, the initiative has never matured. Accusing fingers have ever since been directed at Cameroon which stormed out of the venture soon after its creation for unspecified reasons. Against the backdrop of blazing Boko Haram threats in the region, experts say reactivating the force may prove vital in checking crossborder movements by members of the radical group.

According to experts, material and financial commitments and effective contributions from all member states will be central in ensuring the active takeoff of the force. Reviving the slugging joint force is one of the major challenges that will face the new executive secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, a post expected to be occupied by Nigerian engineer, Sanusi Imran Abdullahi.

On December 31 2011, Abuja ordered the closure of Nigeria’s borders with Cameroon, Niger and Chad over suspicion and proof that Boko Haram militants were using the neighboring countries as hideouts. Nigerian diplomats say the Boko Haram menace is negatively affecting countries in the region, hence the need for joint action.

Abdullahi Omaki, Nigeria's ambassador to Chad has told the News Agency of Nigeria, NAN that the federal government's directive to close the country's border in some troubled parts of Borno, Yobe, Niger and Plateau States with some neighboring is dealing severe blows to the economies of the latter.

Speaking on the sidelines of the LCBC summit, he said Cameroon and Chad were hardest hit. "The volume of trade, largely unrecorded, is about 80 per cent in favor of Nigeria. Most of the goods and services coming into Chad, 80 per cent come from Nigeria with less than 20 per cent coming from Cameroon. If the borders were not closed and you go through the Banki road, the Gambo road you will see the numbers of trailers that are plying that route on daily basis.

"Now that the border has been closed with effect from the end of last year, if you ask the Cameroonian authority, they will tell you how much they are losing in terms of revenue that they collect from these vehicles that pass through Banki and Gamboru.''

According to him, Chadian businessmen now source their goods from Sudan and other African countries at relatively higher costs, adding that Nigerian businessmen are also feeling the pinch of the border shutdown. "The effect is both ways. Nigerian business people are also losing because those goods are not coming.”

Omaki voiced optimism the situation in his country would improve and result in the reopening of the sealed borders soon. But skeptics maintain it may take years, unless a multi-national approach, including the reactivation of the joint military force, is embarked upon to scale down Boko Haram movements.

Previously, critics have warned that following the Arab Spring that swept away Muamar Gaddafi as well as recent rebel agitations in Chad and the Central African Republic, weapons circulation has increased in the region, easing access for groups like Boko Haram and pirates in the Gulf of Guinea

[jeryy]

Nigeria, Cameroon sign pact on Boko Haram, piracy

Wednesday, 29 February 2012.

THE Federal Government yesterday signed a bilateral agreement with the Republic of Cameroon on the establishment of a trans-border security committee.

Members of the terrorist group, Boko Haram, have been moving to Cameroon and other neighbouring countries to hide after perpetuating deadly attacks in the northern parts of Nigeria.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Olugbenga Ashiru signed the agreement on behalf of the Federal Government.

He said the ceremony was timely as it happened at a period when the world is fighting terrorism and piracy.

Ashiru said: “There is no region that is immune to the heinous activities of terrorist groups and pirates.

“The United Nations and the African Union have led the international and regional initiatives to combat these challenges.”

According to him, the international conference on Somalia in London and ECOWAS summit in Abuja dwelt extensively on the dangers of terrorism and piracy.

The agreement, Ashiru said, would constitute a major bilateral initiative aimed at strengthening security along both countries’ borders.

The minister said Nigeria attaches great importance to the agreement because it demonstrates the ability and political will of both countries in addressing the challenges.

“Nigeria is committed to its full implementation and realisation of its objectives in the interest of the progress, peace and security of the people of our two countries.”

He hoped that Cameroon will also demonstrate the same commitment to the agreement.

The Vice-Prime Minister and Minister Delegate of the Presidency of Cameroon, Amadou Ali, who signed for the Cameroonian government, said the agreement showed that confidence has been restored through permanent dialogue, consultation and reinforcement of cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria.

He said: “The construction of a trans-border road, electricity interconnection project and cultural exchange not only portray the will and determination of the two heads of state but also pave ways for citizens to strengthen the unity.”

http://www.naijatalk.com/main-news/nigeria-news/item/nigeria-cameroon-sign-pact-on-boko-haram-piracy

[manka]

How did such a shitty Arab idea take hold in Africa